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Introduction ..
The Aircraft Digital Flight Control Technical Review was initiated by two pilot induced
oscillation (PIO) incidents in the spring and summer of 1992. Maj Gen Franklin (PEO) wondered why
the Air Force development process for digital flight control systems was not preventing PIO problems.
Consequently, a technical review team was formed to examine the development process and determine
why PIO problems continued to occur. The team was also to identify the "best practices" used in the
various programs they looked at.
The charter of the team was to focus on the PIO problem, assess the current development
process, and document the "best practices'. A multi-agency, multi-disciplinary team was established
with members from Air Force Material Command/Engineering (AFMC/EN), Wright Laboratory/Flight
Dynamics Directorate (WL/FIG), Aeronautical Systems Center/Engineering (ASC/EN) (both engineers
and managers were represented), and Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) (both engineers and pilots
were represented). The team conducted the review in July and August of 1992 and prepared the final
report and briefing for Gen Yates, the AFMC commander, in August and September 1992.
The team reviewed all major USAF aircraft programs with digital flight controls, specifically,
the F-15E, F-16C/D, F-22, F-I 11, C-17, and B-2. The team interviewed contractor, System Program
Office (SPO), and Combined Test Force (CTF) personnel on these programs. The team also went to
NAS Patuxent River to interview USN personnel about the F/A-18 program. The team also reviewed
experimental USAF and NASA systems with digital flight control systems: the X-29, X-31, F-15
STOL and Maneuver Technology Demonstrator (SMTD), and the Variable In-Flight Stability Test
Aircraft (VISTA). The team also discussed the problem with other experts in the field, including
Ralph Smith and personnel from Calspan. The following are the major conclusions and
recommendations of that review.
Findings: Digital Mechanization
First of all, a review of aircraft that have experienced PlO problems in the past indicates that
PIO is not a problem caused by _ mechanization per se. PlOs have been encountered with all
kinds of control system mechanizations. Mechanical, hydromechanical, electromechanical, and analog
electronic systems have all encountered PIOs in the past. Table 1, from Reference 1, shows several
PlO problems that have occurred in the past.
However, digital electronic flight control systems have allowed us to break the space, weight,
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and power barriers that effectively limited the flight control complexity that could be achieved with
other control system mechanizations. With digital flight mechanization we can tailor the flight control
system for a far wider variety of flight conditions and flight tasks than was possible before. This
added complexity adds some additional risk that may require a more disciplined, more structured
process to manage in the development process.
Findings: Development Process
All of the programs we looked at used pretty much the same development process. A simple
schematic of that process is shown in Figure L This process is inherently iterative. Each step is
intended to better identify the system and reevaluate the system based on the latest identification.
When problems are encountered the design should be modified, re-identified and reevaluated, when
problems are overcome the process moves on to the next step. This process is intended to reduce risk
as the uncertainty decreases. Our conclusions about the process were that the process had the right
steps, but the execution varied from program to program.
In some programs, the twin constraints of cost and schedule sometimes drove the process to
run "open-loop" when flying qualities problems (including possible PIO problems) were encountered.
For example, if a design did not meet the quantitative requirements in the specification and the
necessary fix significantly impacted cost or schedule, some programs discounted the applicability of the
requirements and decided to proceed with simulation to see if the problems existed. If problems were
encountered in simulation and the necessary fix significantly impacted cost or schedule, some programs
discounted the fidelity of the simulator and decided to proceed with flight test to see if the problems
existed.
Findings: PlO
Figure 2 shows a simplified schematic of the pilot-vehicle system. The pilot can be viewed as
a feedback system that closes the outer-loop around the airframe-sensor-flight control system. The
feedback path for the pilot is a multi-channel path that includes the pilot's visual cues (outside and
inside the cockpit), motion cues, aural cues, tactile cues (force and displacement) from his controllers,
and others. A PIO occurs when this outer loop becomes dynamically unstable or neutrally stable. In
the most general sense, a PlO is the result of a disharmony between the pilot's action and the expected
aircraft reaction. This occurs when one or more of these feedback cues provide confusing or even
con.flicting information to the pilot and his gain is high enough to drive the outer-loop system unstable.
PlO susceptibility is when the aircraft possesses certain characteristics that make it prone to get into a
PlO in flight conditions and tasks in which it must frequently fly. The typical causes of PlO
susceptibility are well known: high stick sensitivity, excessive system phase lag, large system
nonlinearities, lightly damped response modes, unstable response modes, coupled response modes, etc.
Each of these problems causes some kind of disharmony in one or more of the pilot's feedback
channels.
However, the presence of such characteristics does not mean that the aircraft will PIO all the
time. There are other factors involved as well. First of all, a PlO is more likely to occur when the
pilot is performing a "high gain" task, that is, he is trying hard to minimize an error in aircraft attitude
or rate. Such "high gain" tasks include precision landing, carrier landing, aerial refuelling
(particularly probe-and-drogue), LAPES, close formation flying, target tracking, etc. A PIO is more
likely to occur in these kinds of tasks than in tasks where the pilot is only loosely monitoring aircraft
attitude or rate and making occasional corrections.
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Thepilotisafactorin theprobabilityof aPIOoccurenceb causeapilotcan learn to avoid
PlOs in a specific airplane by learning the tasks and the conditions in which that airplane is PIO prone,
and learning to avoid it by lowering his gain in those tasks and conditions. Thus a PIO is less likely
with a pilot who is experienced with the airplane's PIO tendencies and has learned the appropriate
technique to avoid it. PIO is more likely with a pilot who is unfamiliar with the airplane or is unaware
of its PIO tendencies. The fact that the pilot is a factor in a PIO should not be interpreted to mean that
the pilot is at fault. PIO susceptibility is a design flaw because the aircraft is supposed to be designed
such that a pilot can command the necessary degree of precision to do the task without fear of driving
the outer loop unstable. An aircraft can and should be designed such that it is not PIO prone in tasks
or conditions in which it must commonly operate. The team struggled with the perception that such a
design might be impractical from a cost, weight or performance perspective until a very high
performance front-line fighter was considered that had never had a PlO and was clearly in the "good"
handling qualities regime. This aircralt had set the standard in cost, weight and performance. It was
not designed specifically for PIO but careful attention had been paid during it's design to the
characteristics that cause good handling qualities.
Sometimes a PIO is initiated by a discrete event, commonly called a "trigger event'. A trigger
event is not necessary for a PIO to occur, nor will the identical trigger event initiate a PlO every time.
This is because the trigger event is not the cause of a PlO, it is only a catalyst. A trigger event could
be something related to the aircraft such as a discontinuity in the control system (e.g. a sudden failure
or a large discontinuity in the control law gain schedule), or it could be something totally unrelated to
the aircraft such as a large, abrupt atmosperic disturbance or a pilot distraction. In a PIO prone
aircraft, the trigger event will initiate the PlO by causing the pilot to make abrupt corrections, and the
PlO tendencies (due to whatever factors) will provide the "confusion" that sustains the PlO, If the
aircraft is not PlO prone to begin with, the trigger event will probably not cause a PlO because the
pilot can apply sudden corrections without becoming "confused'.
Of all of these factors, only the aircraft susceptibility and certain trigger events are within the
control of the designer. Mission requirements may demand that certain "high gain" tasks be done.
The aircraft will be flown by pilots with a wide range of experience (the only way to gain experience
with an aircraft is to start learning without any). Certain trigger events are random events with a high
probability that they will happen to someone sometime in the aircraft's service life. In order to design
an aircrait that is not PlO prone the designer must control those well-known factors that cause PIO
susceptibility. The difficult question for the designer is "What values of these factors provide the
appropriate level of PIO resistance?"
The reason that this is a difficult question is that, like all sciences that involve the human
element, flying qualities issues, including PIO susceptibility, have the characteristics of a "soft"
science. That is, since a human being's appraisal is the measure of merit, it is very subjective in
nature, and highly variable depending on what human being is doing the evaluating. This variability
exists in both the research end, where you are trying to develop criteria to address the problem, and on
the verification end, where you are trying to prove that your delivered product is satisfactory. Thus,
there is not necessarily an absolute answer, but instead a certain probability based on evaluation by a
number of human beings.
The nature of the problem is illustrated in Figure 3. Cooper-Harper pilot ratings are the most
common quantitative measure used in flying qualities evaluations. For a typical handling qualities
experiment, the correlation curve of a parameter that correlated with Cooper-Harper ratings would
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typically look something like that shown in Figure 3. At the "good" end of the curve, there is a
certain point up to which, in a typical experiment, all of the pilots will agree that the aircraft is good,
and the diversity of Cooper-Harper ratings will be small. At the "bad" end of the curve, there is a
certain point beyond which all of the pilots will agree that the aircraft is bad, and the diversity of
Cooper-Harper ratings will be small. Between these two points is an area where it is more difficult to
say precisely how bad the aircraft is because the diversity of pilot ratings will be much greater at any
point in this region than at the ends (References 2 and 3). Consequently, the objective, open-loop
requirements derived from handling qualities research must be considered inferential in nature. That
is, meeting them will provide a high probability of having good handling qualities, but it does not
guarantee good handling qualities.
Findings: Flying qualities specifications
The quantitative PlO criteria available in the currant flying qualities specification, M_-STD-
1797, and from other sources, are based largely on data generated in experiments conducted on
ground-based and in-flight simulators in the 1960s and 1970s. The review team found that of all the
available criteria, no one criteria seems to be universally accepted by the community at large. In the
flying qualities specifications, most of the quantitative PlO requirements resided in paragraphs that
were intended to assure good overall flying qualities, not just to preclude PIO. For example, in MIL-
STD-1797 requirements on phase lag in the pitch response reside in paragraph 4.2.1.2 Short-term
Pitch Response. In the specifications, paragraphs intended explicitly to preclude PIO problems have
been largely qualitative in nature ('there shall be no tendency for PIO'). Finally, the verification
requirements in MIL-STD-1797 do not specifically call for testing for PIO characteristics. The lack of
a strong tie between the requirements and the verification at each stage of the process has led some
programs to defer critical actions at a time when small changes could have precluded a much more
significant change later on.
Findings: Flight Test Phase
The final test of the flying qualities and the PlO tendencies of an aircraft is in the flight test
phase. The problem with waiting until the flight test phase to determine the degree of PIO
susceptibility is that by this point in the development the number of realistic options to resolve
problems is dramatically reduced, and design changes at this stage have a greater impact on cost and
schedule than at earlier stages. Often a cheaper and easier solution at this stage is to train the pilots to
avoid the PlO if they can. Consequently, a system with a PlO tendency sometimes does not get fixed
unless the pilots cannot find a technique to avoid the PIO or it prevents mission accomplishment.
Conclusions
As a result of these findings, the Review Team concluded that the process, as currently
implemented, had the the following flaws: .......
1) The available criteria and analysis methods are inferential in nature, they lack universal
acceptance, and the current test techniques are not rigorous for PlO problems.
2) Because of this, the current process lacks firm go/no-go criteria at each step in the process
for the manager to assess the risk of PlO and decide whether to proceed or whether further iteration is
necessary.
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3)Consequently,withregardtoflyingqualitiesingeneralandPIOinparticular,the
development process tends to be driven "open-loop" instead of as an iterative process.
4) Finally, the decision of what is good enough is typically left until the flight test phase,
where many options that were available in previous development phases are now precluded by cost and
schedule constraints, and changes are made only if the pilots cannot be trained to avoid the PIO or the
task cannot be modified and retain it's military utility.
Recommendations
The Review Team made the following recommendations to resolve these problems in the
process.
First, establish an Integrity Approach for flight control similar in nature to those established
for structures and propulsion. The intent of this program would be to change the paradigm from one
of "proceed unless a PIO problem is proven to exist" to one of "proceed only when a PIO problem is
proven not to exist'. This would be done through establishment of firm go/no-go criteria for each step
in the development process. At the design stage it would consist of improved flying qualities criteria.
However, since these would still be inferential in nature, further "gates" would be established at other
steps in the process. Rigorous demonstration maneuvers, such as Handling Qualities During Tracking
(HQDT) would be required in early stages of the development process, such as ground simulation. In-
flight simulation would be recommended, perhaps even required if results were inconclusive in the
earlier stages. Finally, the verification of adequate PIO resistance would not just be compliance with
the inferential requirements, but also satisfactory handling qualities in the demonstration maneuvers
during flight test. With the requirements and verification agreed to between the Air Force and the
contractor, this process provides a relevant measure of the capability of the aircraft to be operated by
the vast majority of the pilot corps.
The second recommendation was to establish a Flying Qualities Working Group in each SPO
that has an aircraft under development. The initial purpose of this group is to conduct an assessement
of the system and attempt to achieve the appropriate balance between design, pilot-training and military
utility. This working group consists of engineers from the SPO, the contractor, the laboratories, and
the Flight Test Center, and the test pilots from the contractor and the Flight Test Center. The purpose
of the Flying Qualities Working Group is to monitor the progress of the flying qualities of the design
through the development stages, help resolve problems, and insure that potential problems are
communicated to all the agencies involved.
The third recommendation was to enhance the flying qualities research program to improve the
criteria and analysis methods available. The objective is to resolve the conflicts between existing
criteria, develop a more comprehensive analysis method, and, hopefully, reduce the region of
uncertainty in the present predictive methodology. Another objective would be to develop criteria and
analysis methods for new flight regimes (such as high angle of attack) and unconventional response
modes (such as direct lift).
The fourth recommendation was to incorporate the "Best Practices" into a new tool being
developed for the SPO engineer called the Air Force Acquisition Model (AFAM). The Review Team
identified 22 "Best Practices'. Space limitations preclude listing all of them here, but they are
summarized below:
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1) In the requirements definition stage, use quantitative PIO requirements in the specifications,
with specific verification requirements.
2) In the design stage, use multiple analysis methods and criteria to assess the flying qualities
of the design.
3) Keep the needs of flight test in mind during the design. For example, include a means to
change control system gains during the flight test phase in anticipation of the need to adjust them in
order to resolve problems.
4) Ground test with hardware in the loop to identify system characteristics.
Use fuU-up ground simulation and in-flight simulation to assess handling qualities and PIO
tendencies and use well-defmed "high gain" pilot-in-the-loop tasks.
6) In the flight test stage, use well-defined "high gain" pilot-in-the-loop handling qualities
testing (HQDT, etc.) as part of the envelope expansion process.
On 5 Feb 1993, the findings and recommendations of the Review Team were briefed to the
Commander of Air Force Materiel Command. He has directed that AFMC implement the
recommendations.
As a result of these and previous briefings to the senior leadership of the Air Force,
the "best practices" are being included in the AFAM for use in current and future Air Force programs.
The SPO's either have or are now forming the working groups and conducting assessments to be
reviewed by the Program Director. The Air Force Science and Technology program funding for
flying qualities has been increased by over 100%. Finally, the Commander of Aeronautical Systems
Center through the Directorate of Engineering is planning to release a draR Integrity Program standard
by the end of 1993. The focus of the Air Force on the total system requirements for affordable,
capable and sustainable aircraR that meet the users needs has been improved by the contributions of all
of the team members.
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TABLE I. Some Past PIO Problems (Taken from NOR-64-143)
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Task
FIGURE 2. Simplified Schematic of Pilot-Vehicle System
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